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 31 Introduction
A vast literature has investigated the costs of involuntary job displacement - de￿ned as job loss due to
a ￿rm￿ s closure or downsizing - in such forms as post-displacement earnings losses, unemployment
spells and human capital depreciation (see, among earlier contributions, Hamermesh, 1987 and
Jacobson et al., 1993). However, additional important non-pecuniary job attributes exist that may
be a⁄ected by displacement and have not yet received much attention in the literature. This paper
aims to analyze the consequences of job displacement in terms of such attributes, namely job safety.
In particular, we investigate whether and to what extent job displacement a⁄ects workers￿safety
by comparing displaced workers￿outcomes in terms of workplace injuries (and other proxies for
injury risk) with those of a control group of similar non-displaced workers.
An assessment of the e⁄ect of involuntary job loss on work-related injuries is important for
several reasons. First, according to the theory of compensating di⁄erentials and equalizing di⁄er-
ences (Brown, 1980) a complete evaluation of individual wealth should embody both the earnings
from and non-pecuniary aspects of one￿ s job. Many studies, especially those on wage premia for
risks (for a comprehensive survey see Viscusi and Aldy, 2003), consider a job as being character-
ized by its monetary aspects (i.e. salary) and by other amenities, such as job safety measures
provided by an employing ￿rm. The simultaneity in the choice of the preferred combination of
salary and injury risk implies that an expected worsening of working conditions after displacement
should lead to a lower salary, a greater risk of injury or, most likely, both. To the extent that
displaced workers are re-employed in other jobs with similar wages but higher (lower) job-related
risks, a welfare analysis conducted exclusively on salaries would understate (overstate) the total loss
for the displaced workers. Moreover, as emphasized by many studies, workers￿pre-displacement
characteristics have signi￿cant e⁄ects on post-displacement outcomes (Fallick, 1996, Kletzer, 1998).
2Therefore, to evaluate the treatment e⁄ect of displacement, the treated (displaced) group has to be
comparable with a control group (non-displaced) with respect to any relevant attribute of a job,
including work-related injury risks. Therefore, taking into account pre-displacement workplace risk
as an additional control variable allows us to re￿ne the "conditional independence assumption"
(CIA) on which identi￿cation strategy is based.1
Second, higher post-displacement injury rates might lead to substantial welfare losses and health
costs through increase in the number of days of work lost or due to the payment of disability
pensions. An additional long-run e⁄ect might be observed if serious injuries permanently reduce
workers￿production capacities.
The e⁄ect of job displacement and unemployment on health has been investigated in many
studies. A ￿rst stream of this literature aims at understanding the negative e⁄ect of unemployment
or job loss on health in the form of a higher incidence of stress-related and psychological diseases
(Carr-Hill et al., 1996, Field and Briggs, 2001, Iversen and Sabroe, 1989, Keefe et al., 2002, Jin
et al., 1995). These studies report that unemployed or displaced workers make more use of drugs
and public health-care services (such as consultation of physician and hospitalization). A second
body of literature assesses the long-run e⁄ect of job displacement on mortality rates for displaced
workers (Eliason and Storrie, 2004, Morris et al., 1994, Moser et al., 1987, Sullivan and Wachter,
2009).
Two recent studies are particularly related to our work. Rege et al. (2009) investigate the
consequences of downsizing on the probability of applying for and receiving a disability pension due
to a reduction in "work capacity". As will be explained later, our approach di⁄ers substantially
from that of Rege et al. (2009). In their study, disability pensions are granted due to illness, mental
1See section 3 for the de￿nition of the CIA assumption.
3disorders, injuries or defect. Because the decision to apply for a disability pension largely depends
on workers￿evaluation of the alternative opportunities available to them, the authors focus their
analysis on the e⁄ect of displacement on this decision. In our study, the available data on job-
related injuries allows us to analyze the direct impact of displacement on injury rates, by making
the reasonable assumption that workers do not voluntarily become injured. A second study (Kuhn
et al., 2009) analyzes the e⁄ect of plant closure on the taking-up of health provisions and on the
utilization of sickness bene￿ts by displaced workers comparing them to a control group of non-
displaced workers. The authors report an increase in health costs for displaced workers, which is
mainly caused by an increase in the amount of sickness bene￿ts paid. This increase is explained by
the fact that for unemployed workers, sickness bene￿ts are greater than unemployment bene￿ts. As
a result, the authors ￿nd a small e⁄ect on number of days of sick leave among displaced workers. To
our knowledge, however, no empirical work to date has examined the consequences for re-employed
displaced workers in terms of workplace injuries.
To evaluate the e⁄ects of displacement, in this paper, we analyze post-displacement earnings
and job safety using a unique dataset for the period of 1994-2002 that combines work histories
from the Italian administrative "Work Histories Italian Panel" (WHIP) database and individual
work-related injury data from the Italian Workers￿Compensation Authority (INAIL). We focus on
involuntary job losses of workers with at least three years of tenure to limit potential heterogeneity
problems and self-selection issues. We restrict our analysis to workers displaced in 1997 due to
￿rm closures. This strategy allows us to observe workers three years before displacement, thereby
enabling the construction of reliable pre-displacement working histories and thus allowing us to
match displaced workers with comparable controls (also in terms of injury rates). It also leaves
a ￿ve-year interval in which to evaluate the consequences of the job loss. A longer time period
4after displacement allows us to more precisely reconstruct workers￿career histories 2 and provides
a reasonably su¢ cient window to observe rare injury episodes. To estimate the causal e⁄ect of
displacement on earnings and on the subsequent risk of being injured in the workplace we combine
industry-speci￿c propensity score matching techniques with a Di⁄erences-in-Di⁄erences estimator
(DID).
We ￿nd that, in a period marked by tight labour market, re-employed displaced workers in
Italy experience only moderate and short-lived earnings losses, but that, as a consequence of dis-
placement, they are about 70 percent more likely to be injured at their subsequent jobs than a
control group of non-displaced workers. Moreover, this e⁄ect on job safety is not transitory and
does not diminish in magnitude as time passes.These results seem to suggest that re-employed dis-
placed workers, to avoid unemployment or earnings losses, trade-o⁄ pecuniary job attributes for
non-pecuniary ones, even during a period of positive labour market performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the problem
of multidimensionality in the evaluation of post-displacement outcomes. The identi￿cation strategy
and econometric methodology are discussed in section 3. Section 4 describes the data in greater
detail and provides some descriptive evidence. Estimation results are presented and discussed in
section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Heterogeneity and multidimensional displacement outcomes
The study of the relationship between earnings and workplace risk is not new in the literature.
Implicit market theory (Rosen, 1974) shows that the analysis of the relationship between salaries and
2An accurate reconstruction of career histories enables the tracking of movements of workers across di⁄erent ￿rms
and increases the likelihood of detecting false ￿rms￿deaths. For a discussion of this phenomenon see section 4.
5risk is complex, as these two job attributes are jointly determined in equilibrium with heterogenous
agents on both the demand and supply sides of the labour market. Hamermesh (1999) jointly
analyzed the trends in earnings and in workplace risk inequalities. In this section we borrow from
his theoretical framework.
Although workers performing more hazardous jobs should be compensated with higher salaries,
heterogeneity in employees￿characteristics and in particular the inability to observe their produc-
tivity results in a negative correlation between injury rates and earnings (Brown, 1980, Garen, 1988,
Hamermesh, 1999, Hwang et al., 1992). Therefore, if safety is a normal good, an income e⁄ect leads
to workers with higher potential earnings choosing safer jobs.
Figure 1 illustrates this phenomenon. Panel (a) shows ￿rms￿isopro￿t curves ( ￿i)3 and two
types of workers with the same preferences over the wage-injury risk bundles (i.e., utility curves Ui)
and di⁄erent earnings potentials (i.e., intercepts ￿i, due to human capital di⁄erences, other rents
or match-speci￿c determinants) that face the same trade-o⁄ between wage and injury risk (i.e., all
isopro￿t curves have the same slope). A type-A worker has higher potential earnings than a type-B
individual (i.e., a higher intercept, ￿A > ￿B). Isopro￿t curves are upward sloping; that is, ￿rms
o⁄er higher salaries at increasing levels of risk. If job-safety is a normal good, because workers have
the same preferences and are confronted with the same trade-o⁄, a type A worker will choose a
safer job than a type B worker (with respective injury risks equal to IA < IB), due to an income
e⁄ect.
Combinations of salaries and injury risks in panel (a) of ￿gure 1 represent the pre-displacement
working conditions. To compare changes in job characteristics after displacement, displaced workers
need to be matched to non-displaced individuals with similar observable working conditions and
3For simplicity￿ s sake isopro￿t curves are drawn as straight lines, although their slopes should be decreasing as
the injury rate increases.
6characteristics. Panel (a) shows that individuals with jobs described by point C are not good control
subjects for individuals of type B, as they have lower skills or lower earnings potential (￿C < ￿B).
Therefore, comparing workers exclusively in terms of their wages can be misleading as similar wages
could hide di⁄erent earnings potentials. Therefore, it is important to choose appropriate controls
in terms of both observed wages and injury rates. More generally, choosing controls only in terms
of observable pre-displacement characteristics and standard labour market outcomes may not be
su¢ cient to grasp important "non-ignorable" unobservables.
Let us now assume that appropriate controls were assigned to displaced workers of type B. Panel
(b) of ￿gure 1 displays a possible outcome for the displaced worker, Bd2;relative to a non-displaced
worker, BND. If displaced individuals experience a loss of earnings potential (￿Bd2 < ￿BND), for
example, due to a loss of ￿rm/industry-speci￿c human capital (or other kind of rents), and, as a
consequence, are re-employed in jobs on a lower isopro￿t curve ￿B0, comparing their wages with
a those of non-displaced individual BND could be misleading. Such an analysis would estimate a
zero-welfare loss when comparing the earnings of Bd2 to BND, ignoring the higher injury risk of
the former.
The higher risk of injury compensates for the loss of earnings potential. Therefore, ideally,
to correctly evaluate the impact of displacement, we need to take into account all possible labor
market outcomes before and after displacement and to compare workers with similar observed
and unobserved characteristics. This task is complex because, as shown by Rosen (1974), job at-
tributes are determined in equilibrium and depend on the heterogeneity of individuals￿preferences
(e.g., their taste for risk) and heterogeneity on the labor demand side (e.g., the slope of an iso-
pro￿t curve indicating how ￿rms reward risky jobs). The industry-speci￿c propensity score-DID
procedure described in the next section is aimed to reduce the problem of ￿nding a proper counter-
7factual by assigning to each treated (displaced) individual an appropriate control (non-displaced)
individual. By choosing controls through a sector-speci￿c propensity score-matching procedure
that takes into account any available non-ignorable job, ￿rm and demographic characteristics, we
hope to have enough coordinates to construct a credible counterfactual. Importantly, workers with
analogous pre-displacement job histories (in terms of standard and non-pecuniary labor market
outcomes) who work in similar ￿rms belonging to the same industry are also likely to face similar
remuneration-injury risk trade-o⁄s and, thus, to be comparable in terms of their preferences for
risk. In other words, imposing exact matching on sector while considering demographic, ￿rm and
job characteristics should deal simultaneously with the heterogeneity of individuals￿preferences
and with heterogeneity on the labor demand side. In turn, this accurate multidimensional strat-
egy to build counterfactuals should reduce potential biases related to non-ignorable unobservables.
Nevertheless, we will also complement this matching procedure with a DID estimator that further
di⁄erences away any remaining individual unobserved characteristics that are ￿xed over time.
3 Identi￿cation Strategy and Estimators
As Jacobson et al. (1993) have pointed out, the main empirical problem when studying the e⁄ects
of displacement is equivalent to that in the program-evaluation literature. One can observe the
labour market outcome of the displaced workers (i.e., program participants) but not the outcomes
for these workers had they not been displaced (i.e., not participated in the program).
Indeed, the goal of our analysis is to identify the average e⁄ect of displacement on the displaced
workers with respect to various labour market outcomes. In the evaluation literature, this e⁄ect
is known as the average treatment e⁄ect on the treated (ATT), which is simply a special case
of the general notion of average partial e⁄ects computed for the treated part of the population
8(Wooldridge, 2002). Let us de￿ne as Di as a variable taking the value 1 if a worker has been
displaced (i.e., the individual is exposed to the treatment) and 0 if he has not been displaced. Each
individual has two potential outcomes: Yi(Di = 1), in the case of treatment and Yi(Di = 0) in the
case of no treatment. The problem is that one is not able to observe both outcomes for the same
individual, that is to directly compute E(Yi(0)jDi = 1). It is possible to directly compute only
E(Yi(0)jDi = 0) and E(Yi(1)jDi = 1).
Following this literature, our identi￿cation strategy is based on the conditional independence
assumption (CIA). This assumption states that, conditional on workers￿ pre-treatment charac-
teristics4, the potential outcome in the non-treatment scenario is independent of the treatment
status. In particular, expressions for the mean potential outcomes conditional on covariates are
functions of participation status, observed outcomes, and covariates only: E(Yi(0)jDi = 1;X) =
E(Yi(0)jDi = 0;X).5 Indeed, even if a plant closure can be seen as an exogenous shock at the plant
level because all workers at the closing ￿rm have to leave (irrespective of their ability, motivation
and other characteristics that are unobserved by the researcher), it may still not constitute a natural
experiment as: a) the structural change driving the closure of establishments is over-represented
in certain sectors and regions of the economy; b) there could be systematic job matching between
workers who have a low preference for job safety or are, in general, less risk-averse and establish-
ments with low survival probability; c) the characteristics of the workers could be in principle one
of the causes of the ￿rms￿closure; and d) some workers leave the ￿rm before it closes down. More
generally, the group of displaced workers cannot be expected to be a random sample in terms of
4These pre-treatment characteristics must be strictly exogenous, that is, it is assumed that they are not a⁄ected
by the treatment, either ex-post or in anticipation of the treatment. The CIA will hold if these characteristics include
all of the variables that a⁄ect both the selection into treatment (e.g., workers￿displacement) and the outcomes of
interest (e.g., earnings).
5It would be strictly su¢ cient to assume mean independence to recover the ATT. However, it is very di¢ cult to
credibly justify the validity of the stricter assumption but not of the more general one (see Imbens, 2004).
9non-ignorable (observable and unobservable) characteristics. Therefore, our conditioning set X,
see table A, is su¢ ciently rich and takes into account many important non-ignorable job, ￿rm and
demographic characteristics.
Di⁄erent econometric techniques have been developed in observational studies to overcome the
biases generated when computing the ATT based on the CIA. All available parametric, semipara-
metric, and nonparametric estimators are (implicitly or explicitly) based on the assumption that
one can recover the counterfactual for every treated individual by taking into account all factors
that jointly in￿ uence selection and outcomes. In this study, we employ propensity score match-
ing estimators (PSM) (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) to produce such comparisons. An advantage
of these estimators is that they are semiparametric and thus allow for arbitrary individual-e⁄ect
heterogeneity.6 The aim of the propensity score-matching, and of matching estimators in general
(Heckman et al., 1997), is ￿rst to reduce elements of the bias that are due to the non-overlapping
support of treated and control subjects￿characteristics (i.e., to avoid comparing workers who are al-
ready di⁄erent in the pre-treatment period) and, second, the component that is due to misweighting
on the common support of such characteristics (in fact, even in the common support, the distribu-
tion of the treated and of the untreated could be di⁄erent). Therefore, the traditional econometric
selection bias that stems from the "selection on unobservables￿is assumed to be absent, that is,
the matching method is based on the assumption of conditional independence (CIA).
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that if potential non-treatment outcomes are independent
of treatment status conditional on the covariates X , they are also independent conditional on a
balancing score b(X), and the propensity score, P(X) = Pr(D = 1jX), constitutes one possible
balancing score. This ￿nding is important for solving the ￿curse of dimensionality￿problem and
6For the di⁄erence between multivariate OLS and matching see, for example, Angrist and Krueger (1999).
10to identify the ATT by using the propensity score even when, as in our case, many pre-treatment
continuos variables have to be taken into account to build a credible counterfactual. Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983) have also stated the second assumption needed to identify the ATT under the
CIA, the so-called "overlap" assumption: the support of the conditional distribution of X given
D = 0, overlaps completely with that of the conditional distribution of X given D = 1: In practice,
researchers assess this last assumption by comparing the descriptive statistics between the treated
and the control groups and/or by inspecting the distribution of the propensity score for treated and
control groups. At a minimum, matching can be used as a method for improving and checking the
overlap in distributions of covariates (Rubin, 2006, Imbens and Woolridge, 2009).
We augment the robustness of the matching estimator by taking advantage of the panel structure
of the data and by implementing a propensity score matching-di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimator
(PSM-DID) (Heckman et al., 1997, Smith and Todd, 2005). Indeed, if the point-wise bias due to
￿selection on unobservables￿B(X) is constant over time, that is unobserved heterogeneity is ￿xed
in time, we have:
Bpost(X) ￿ Bpre(X) = 0











(Yj; post ￿ Yj; pre)
3
5
where w(i;j) is the weight placed on the jth observation in constructing the counterfactual for
the ith treated observation, and n1 is the number of treated observations. Matching estimators
di⁄er in the ways in which they construct the weights w(i;j). To build the counterfactual in
the non-treatment scenario for displaced workers, we have experimented with many alternative
matching algorithms (nearest neighbor(s), Caliper, Radius, Kernel and Local Linear weights). In
￿nite samples (with a high ratio of treated to untreated individuals and/or a limited overlap in
11the covariates￿distributions), the choice of matching algorithm can be important (Heckman et al.
(1997), Busso et al., 2009). Therefore, the performance of various estimators depends on the data
structure in question. When there is overlap in the distribution of covariates between the comparison
and treatment groups, matching algorithms should give similar results (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002).
In this paper, we present only the results from Nearest Neighbour matching (NN) with replacement
routine7, given that the results for the other estimators are qualitatively equivalent.8
In addition, to estimate the average e⁄ect of job displacement on those who are displaced, we
combine this PSM-DID strategy with exact covariate matching. We opted to exactly match on
industry variable (i.e. to compare treated workers only with those non-treated workers who belong
to the same industry) and to estimate a propensity score for each industry separately. According to
the theory of matching, the independent variables that one should use in estimating the propensity
score, i.e. the Xs, are all factors that a⁄ect both the selection into treatment (e.g., the displacement)
and the outcomes under study (e.g., earnings, weeks worked, job safety). From our point of view,
the importance of the determinants of job displacement that are correlated with the outcomes under
scrutiny vary considerably among di⁄erent sectors. This motivates our decision to devote special
attention to the sectorial dimension. Besides, as is explained in the previous paragraph, imposing
exact matching on sector is important to deal simultaneously with heterogeneity of individuals￿
preferences and with heterogeneity on the labour demand side. Although exact matching on all
variables may be preferable, it is not feasible in our case due to the large number of continuous
7On the one hand (as is argued, for example, by Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008 and Dehejia and Wahba, 2002), NN
matching with replacement, by picking the closest control in terms of the estimated propensity score, favours bias
reduction with respect to variance reduction (compared to other variants of NN matching and to other weighting
schemes). Busso et al. (2009) explicitly investigate the ￿nite sample properties of the most popular matching
estimators and ￿nd that Nearest Neighbor Matching with replacement achieves the best performance in terms of
bias reduction. On the other hand, if the closest neighbour is far away, NN matching faces the risk of bypassing the
problem of the common support. This drawback can be avoided by imposing a tolerance level on the propensity
score distance (e.g., a caliper). As shown in section 4.2, this problem seems not to be present in our case.
8Results are available upon request.
12variables involved in the analysis. As discussed in Dehejia (2005), there is no reason to believe that
the same speci￿cation of the propensity score will balance the covariates in di⁄erent samples. In
our case, we consider workers belonging to di⁄erent sectors as belonging to di⁄erent samples.
Our general speci￿cation of the propensity score can be represented as follows:
P(Displacementi; 1997) = ￿fh(WCi;1994;FCi;1994;Hi;1994￿1996)g
where ￿() is the normal cumulative distribution function. To free up the functional form of
the propensity score we include higher-order polynomials and interaction terms, and search for
a speci￿cation that balances the pre-treatment covariates between the treatment and the control
groups conditional on the estimated propensity score (see section 4.2).
The variables used in the estimation of the propensity score are summarized in Table A.
TABLE A: Variables used in the propensity score estimation.
Variables
Gender, age, tenure, log of aggregate annual earnings,
WCi;1994 = Workers￿and job aggregate annual weeks worked, main job function,
characteristics number of employment relationships held in a year,
region of birth, region of work.
FCi;1994 = Firm characteristics industrial sector, number of employees
number of injuries, number of years with a registered
Hi;1994￿1996 = variables computed over episode of sickness leave, number of serious injuries,
the 1994-1996 period number of episodes of "Cassa integrazione"
The set of variables WCi;1994 and FCi;1994 are computed for 1994, that is , three years before
displacement. The set of variables Hi;1994￿1996 is computed for the period three years before
displacement, that is 1994;1995 and 1996. If anticipation e⁄ects in the years preceding displacement
are present, these variables will not completely satisfy strict exogeneity and, as a result, the CIA
assumption might not hold. However, we have chosen to include these years, as episodes of injury,
sickness absences and "Cassa Integrazione"9 are rare events that proxy for job-safety, health status
9The ￿Cassa Integrazione￿is a subsidy that is granted to manufacturing workers employed in ￿rms in bad economic
13and ￿rm characteristics, respectively. The choice of a larger time-window for these covariates is
aimed at smoothing them.10
4 Data and Descriptive Evidence
For our analysis we have merged the Work Histories Italian Panel (WHIP) dataset 11 and the
administrative records from the Italian Workers￿Compensation Authority (INAIL) for the period
of 1994-2002. The resulting dataset provides a random sample of workers employed in the pri-
vate sector of the Italian economy. It includes data on the beginning and ending dates and on
the duration (number of weeks) of each employment relationship.12 The WHIP ￿les also provide
information on workers￿characteristics (age, sex, place of birth, place of work, type of occupation,
maternity leaves, sick leaves), standard labor market outcomes (the number of weeks worked in a
year and annual earnings) and characteristics of the ￿rms at which the individuals in the dataset
are employed (number of employees, ￿rms￿birth and death dates, sector).13 The WHIP dataset
contains a dummy variable that indicates whether the worker has been on sick leave lasting at least
one week in a given year. The INAIL dataset contains the number of injuries and the duration
of injury-related leaves at the employer-employee level in the private sector. It records all injuries
leading to a leave of more than three days. Less serious injuries are not reported. In addition, this
situations, one that guarantees a wage replacement rate of 80%. It is a selective measure, in the sense that only ￿rms
of a certain size belonging to certain sectors are eligible.
10As a robustness check, we have repeated the empirical analysis with these variables at their 1994 values. The
results were qualitatively the same.
11WHIP is a database of individual work histories, based on INPS administrative archives:
http://www.laboratoriorevelli.it/whip/whip_datahouse.php?lingua=eng&pagina=home
12However, it is not possible to consistently recover the quarterly or monthly temporal pattern of earnings or weeks
in employment as for each employment relationship we only observe the annual number of weeks in employment and
annual earnings without additional information on their temporal distributions.
13The structure of the panel is such that we can observe the main characteristics of both employees and ￿rms, but
we cannot observe all employees belonging to a single ￿rm. Therefore, we only observe the characteristics of a ￿rm
to the extent that some workers present in our sample are employed by it.
14dataset also identi￿es serious injuries that lead to a permanent damage to an employee￿ s health.
Note that this last variable is highly correlated with the number of days lost due to injury-related
leaves.
We retained in our sample full-time workers who had at least three years of tenure at their
main job 1997 (i.e., the job with the highest yearly earnings). This choice was made for the
following reasons. First, in this way we ensure comparability with other international studies.
Second, tenured workers are also likely to experience greater losses from job-displacement than
untenured workers as they may have accumulated ￿rm -(or sector-) speci￿c human capital and/or
represent particularly good matches. Internal labor markets (policies for promotion from within)
and incentive pay mechanisms are two other sources of earnings losses whose impacts increase with
tenure. Moreover, we retain workers with at least three years of tenure because our identi￿cation
of the e⁄ects of displacement is mainly based on the possibility of controlling for pre-treatment
employees￿and employers￿characteristics. As is standard in the job displacement literature, we
excluded the construction sector from our sample due to the high seasonality of these jobs. Also,
the energy sector is left out due to its extremely low number of treated individuals (only two).
The main drawback of the WHIP dataset is that workers recorded as non-employed in the
private sector could have found other jobs via self-employment, retired or ended up in the shadow
economy. This is common in studies that use administrative data. For example, Jacobson et al.
(1993) faced a similar problem when using administrative data on Pennsylvanian workers. To solve
this problem, they decided to restrict their sample to workers with positive earnings during all
years, and, as a consequence, they discarded about 40% of high-tenured displaced workers. In this
paper, we follow this approach, which results in elimination of about 48% of the displaced workers
in the sample. As a robustness check, we repeated the estimation procedure for the unbalanced
15sample (by also including workers who re-enter the private sector after 1997) and found qualitatively
identical results.14 Indeed, our estimates should be interpreted more conservatively as the e⁄ect of
displacement on re-employed displaced workers. If the displaced workers are more likely to end up
in the underground economy, where less attention is devoted to workers￿job safety, our estimated
losses constitute a lower-bound estimate of the true e⁄ects.
4.1 De￿nition and Identi￿cation of Closing Establishments and Displaced
Workers
The aim of this work is to study the e⁄ects of job displacement by comparing the labor market
outcomes of displaced workers with those of a control group of non-displaced workers. In particular,
our treated group consists of workers who have been laid-o⁄ due to ￿rm-closures. The following
events are categorized as displacements related to ￿rm-closures:
￿ all cases of workers￿mobility accompanied by a registered closure of the reference ￿rm;
￿ all cases of mobility associated with the absence of a workforce at the end of the reference
year in the reference ￿rm;
￿ separations from closing ￿rms during the two years preceding ￿rm-closure (pre-closing sepa-
rators).
Data from WHIP include an indicator when a ￿rm ceases its activity: a potentially closed ￿rm
is identi￿ed by the disappearance of a ￿rm￿ s identity number from tax returns. However, this
variable often refers to administrative death (e.g., merges and/or legal transformations) and not
14Approximately 21% of displaced workers never re-enter the private sector. These results are available upon
request.
16to economic death ( for a similar issue see Bender et al., 1999, and Kuhn, 2002 ). Workers in
￿rms that are closing down only from an administrative point of view might become reemployed
during subsequent years in the same ￿rm or in entities that are somehow related to the former
employer. To solve this problem, in addition to the procedure adopted for use with the WHIP
dataset by Contini et al. (2009),we developed an algorithm to detect false deaths, which utilizes
information on the connections between employers and employees for all available years. We identify
the links between ￿rms and employees by tracking down all possible connections between workers,
￿rms and job relationships ￿all three of which have distinct identi￿cation number - in the years
preceding and following 1997. An employer-employee relationship, that is interrupted by a ￿rm￿ s
closure but is then followed by re-employment in a ￿rm connected to the previous employer by any
of the above-mentioned links is thus excluded from the sample of displacement events. Wrongly
classifying non-displaced employees as treated individuals would lead to an under-estimation of the
e⁄ects of displacement. To eliminate, or at least reduce, this bias, we exclude from the group of
treated workers those individuals who, in spite of being "displaced" according to the WHIP ￿rm
demography variables, maintained the same employment relationship.
For the purpose of our study, it is important to exclude other cases of mass-layo⁄s (from both the
treated and control groups) and to also include in the treated group pre-closing separators. Indeed,
one can argue, as is common practice in the literature, that displacement approximates a "natural
experiment" at the ￿rm level as long as one is willing to assume that the ￿rm-level processes behind
layo⁄s are not determined by employers￿or employees￿decisions that are based on non-ignorable
workers￿characteristics. In fact, it is possible that selection e⁄ects are at work. On one hand, during
mass layo⁄s (those that are not followed by ￿rm closures) employers could select the "worse" workers
to be laid-o⁄and retain the "better" ones (Gibbons and Katz, 1991). On the other hand, if workers
17anticipate the future closure of their ￿rm, another process of selection could take place: workers may
try to ￿nd another job and separations registered in the years before ￿rm-closure may thus constitute
preemptive resignations (Pfann and Hamermesh, 2001). Therefore, those workers who succeed in
this search process may tend to have comparatively ￿better￿ labour market characteristics (for
example, they could simply have better job-searching abilities or labor market connections) than
those remaining until the ￿bitter end￿ , and thus, they will be comparatively less a⁄ected by the
closure of the ￿rm. However, in practice, we do not know if all pre-closure separators left their ￿rms
for a reason connected with the impending closure as the only information we have is the evolution
of the number of employees in the ￿rm during the years preceding the closure. Nevertheless, the
empirical results of the paper are not sensitive to di⁄erent de￿nitions of pre-closing separators.15
Therefore, for simplicity￿ s sake, in our baseline speci￿cation we include pre-closing separators ,
that is, workers who left their ￿rms within the two years immediately preceding the closure, in the
treatment group.
In the analysis below, we will compare displaced workers to a control group of workers who did
not experience a mass layo⁄or a ￿rm-closure (or a pre-closure separation) during 1997. The control
group should represent the hypothetical (and unobserved) outcomes of the same displaced workers
had they not experience an involuntary job loss, without additionally ruling out a job change. Thus,
our control group also includes those employees whose separations were not related to mass-layo⁄s
or ￿rm closures. However, it is important to point out that among these movers there could also be
workers who were laid-o⁄ on an individual basis, and whom we cannot take into account due to the
administrative nature of the data. The inclusion of employees who do not voluntarily separate in
15We tried di⁄erent de￿nitions of pre-closing separators by enlarging the window to three years before closure and
by restricting it to only one pre-closing year. Moreover, conditioning on the ￿rm-level evolution of the number of
employees (e.g., categorizing as a pre-closing separator a worker who leaves his ￿rm in the year preceding its closure
if and only if during this year there was a net reduction in the number of employees at the ￿rm) leaves the main
empirical results una⁄ected.
18the non-displaced group would cause an under-estimation of the e⁄ects of displacement. In practice,
the main results of the paper do not change if we only include stayers in the control group.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics, Assessment of the Common Support and Propen-
sity Score Estimation
As mentioned above, the aim of estimating the e⁄ect of displacement by matching is to choose a
counterfactual group that is as similar to the treated group as possible (in terms of its non-ignorable
characteristics) by properly selecting and reweighting control individuals. Several techniques are
proposed in the literature to check the quality of the matching procedure according to the property
that if P(X) is the propensity score, then pre-treatment variables must balance given the propensity
score, that is D ? XjP(X) (Rosembaum and Rubin, 1983). To test the e⁄ectiveness of our matching
routine in balancing the covariates we ￿rst implement a balancing test proposed by Dehejia and
Wahba, 2002, and Becker and Ichino, 2002.16 We split the sample into intervals such that the
average propensity scores for the treated and the control groups do not di⁄er in each interval.
Then, within each interval, we verify that the means of each characteristic do not di⁄er between the
treated and control groups. We verify that the balancing property is satis￿ed for every speci￿cation
of the propensity score (and therefore for each sector separately). This procedure is thus also
useful for determining which interactions and higher-order terms to include in the speci￿cation of
the estimated propensity score (given a selected set of covariates X). Additionally, we perform
a standard t-test for equality of means of the covariates to check whether signi￿cant di⁄erences
remain after matching on the propensity score and we show the standardized bias17 before and
16We used the program written by Becker and Ichino (2002).
17The standardized bias is the di⁄erence of the sample means in the treated and non-treated (full or matched)
sub-samples as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and non-treated
groups (formula from Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985).
19after matching. The latter check is done by pooling all sectors together.
Table 1 reports the sample size before matching and di⁄erent related post-matching statistics.
The ￿rst column of Table 1 displays the number of observations by industry and in the economy
as a whole before matching. Our aggregate sample is made up of 31,212 workers. In column 2, we
show the ratio of the number of displaced workers to the number of controls. It is apparent that
for every treated worker, we have a large pool of potential controls, even within each sector, which
is an important pre-requisite to meaningful implementation of our matching strategy. Column 3
displays the percentage of treated individuals retained in the econometric analysis. As explained in
paragraph 3, the overlap assumption is fundamental for the identi￿cation of the ATT. Our sector-
speci￿c propensity score matching strategy excludes from the treated group (and from the control
group) those individuals who possess characteristics that perfectly predict success (or failure) in
the sector-speci￿c propensity score estimation. As a consequence, only 4% of displaced workers
are disregarded. The representativeness of the treated sample used in the matching analysis is also
supported by the fact that the means of the pre-treatment covariates for the treated sample remain
practically unchanged (see Table 2).18 Note that we do not additionally implement other trimming
procedures (such as that proposed by Smith and Todd, 2005) given that, as shown in the remaining
of the paragraph, the lack of overlap does not seem to represent a big issue in this sample, as our
matching routine substantially improves the comparability of the two groups of workers (see table
2). Finally, column 4 of Table 1 shows the average weights assigned to the matched observations.
Given that NN matching with replacement selects for each treated individual the control subject
with the most comparable propensity score, an average weight equal to one means that no control
18In the presence of a homogeneous treatment e⁄ect discarding treated observations does not imply a rede￿nition
of the estimand; rather, it simply indicates a loss in terms of e¢ ciency. Instead, the identi￿cation of the ATT fails in
the case of treatment e⁄ect heterogeneity, in particular when such heterogeneity occurs in the parts of the support
where the treated are dropped. Therefore, our statement in the main text is based on the assumption that individual
observable characteristics are the main cause of heterogeneity in treatment.
20observation has been used more than one time and suggests that we have a su¢ ciently rich reservoir
of controls. In our sample, this value equals 1.1; in fact, 92% of treated individuals were matched
with a control that was not resampled, and only two controls were used three times as a match.19
Table 2 presents statistics for the unmatched and matched samples (U and M, respectively)
during the period of 1994-1996. Column 1 shows the means of the lagged covariates for the treated
group. Column 2 displays the means of the lagged covariates for the control group. The standardized
bias is reported in column 3, while column 4 shows the p-values for the test of equality of means
of the lagged covariates between the treated and the control workers. As can be seen from Table
2, the displaced workers are younger and less tenured than non-displaced individuals; they have
lower earnings; they work fewer weeks per year; and they are more likely to have multiple jobs.
Moreover, among the treated group, the percentages of women and blue-collar workers are larger.
Regarding the geographical spread, the concentration of displaced workers is relatively lower in
the central regions. These results are consistent with empirical evidence from other countries
(Kuhn et al. (2002), Fallick (1996) and Kletzer (1998)). Finally, ￿rms with displaced workers are
overrepresented in the textile, apparel, leather and commerce industries (see Table 1) and are of
relatively smaller size. No pre-treatment di⁄erences were detected with respect to injuries, sickness
and Cassa Integrazione-related variables. Imbens and Woolridge (2009) suggest focusing on the
standardized bias rather than on t-statistics.20 In particular, as a rule of thumb when a standardized
bias is greater than 35, global linear regression methods are very sensitive to the speci￿cation and
19We also ￿nd that the median di⁄erence between the propensity score of the treated individuals and that of the
matched controls is 0.0000193; its 95-th percentile is .0007671. These are very low values compared to the estimated
probability of displacement.
20The reason is that t-statistics increase with sample size. However, simply increasing the sample size does not
make the ATT inference less problematic. Instead, the standardized bias is not systematically a⁄ected by the
sample size. The authors refer to the "normalized di⁄erence" (ND), that is a transformation of the standardized
bias: ND = SB ￿ (
p
0:5=100).
21are not advisable. In our unmatched sample, the value of the standardized bias is very high for
many important covariates (in the cases of tenure and earnings it is around 50). However, once we
apply the matching routine described above, the majority of the above-mentioned di⁄erences are
reduced or disappear.
Although in four cases (age, dummies for being born and working in the south, dummy for being
born outside OECD), the t-test rejects the hypothesis of equal means we believe that this is a minor
issue, as the values of the standardized bias are substantially reduced and that these di⁄erences are
not profound.21 As a robustness check, we also estimated the weighted regressions for the matched
sample of workers (where the weights were those employed in the matching analysis).22 Matching
quality is then increased by exploiting the fact that these weighted regressions have the so-called
double-robustness property ( Rotnitzky and Robins, 1995, Lechner and Wunsch, 2009, Imbens and
Woolridge, 2009, Busso et al., 2009). This property implies that the estimator remains consistent
when either the matching is based on a correctly speci￿ed selection model or the regression model is
correctly speci￿ed. To check the robustness of our matching procedure we applied this methodology
to the linear DID estimator by regressing the di⁄erence between the post-treatment and the pre-
treatment outcomes on a constant, the treatment dummy and other covariates used in the propensity
score estimation.23 Our main results remained robust to this alternative methodology.
21The di⁄erences of the means of these variables between treated individuals and controls are not signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero inside each block of the estimated sector-speci￿c propensity scores. The fact that at the aggregate
level these di⁄erences become signi￿cant is an example of a situation in which increasing the sample size increases
the value of the t-statistics but not the value of the di⁄erences. In other words, the denominator of the t-statistics
decreases.
22As is shown in Busso et al. (2009), all propensity score matching estimators can be practically implemented as
a weighted regression of the outcomes on a costant and a dummy indicating the treatment status.
23In the context of a linear DID estimator based on panel data, Imbens and Woolridge (2009) suggest adding
the pre-treatment outcomes as additional control variables . In their words (p. 70) "making treated and control
units more comparable on lagged outcomes cannot make the causal interpretation less credible" as suggested by the
standard DID assumptions (i.e., the treatment indicator may be correlated with the residual). Clearly, if the values
of the lagged dependent variables are very similar for the treated and the control groups, the standard DID estimator
and this augmented DID estimator will yield similar results. We experimented with various speci￿cations in terms
of the regressors included and ￿exibility of the functional form. For example, we ￿rst introduced a fourth-degree
polynomial in age interacted with geographical dummies. Then, we regressed on all of the variables used in the
22Finally, it is also useful to examine the density functions of the propensity scores for the treated
group and the matched controls to develop a sense of the overlap between them. Figure 2 con￿rms
that propensity score matching increased the comparability between the two groups. While prior
to matching, the estimated kernel densities were quite di⁄erent, after matching very similar values
can be observed.
5 Econometric results and discussion
In this section, we investigate whether and to what extent the displaced workers su⁄er after dis-
placement in terms of earnings, weeks worked, sick leave and measures of injury risk. To this end,
we ￿rst employ the simple unweighted OLS estimator and the propensity score matching technique
focusing on the post-1997 levels of the dependent variables. We then extend the standard propen-
sity score analysis by using a PSM-DID strategy, which is our preferred estimator, and compare it
with a linear unconditional DID estimator.24 Our dependent variables are the logarithm of annual
earnings, the number of weeks worked, the probability of being injured, the number of injuries, the
number of out-of-work days because of injuries and the probability of absences due to sickness.
Tables 3 and 4 show the results from the two methods for the logarithm of annual earnings and
the number of weeks worked. For the sake of comparability with other dependent variables (see
below), we have computed the logarithms of the sum of annual earnings and the sum of annual weeks
worked for the following periods: the year of displacement (year 0), the entire post-displacement
period (years 1,2,3,4,5), the "short-run" period ( years 1,2,3) and the longer-run period (years 4 and
propensity score estimation. The results of these various speci￿cations were very similar, while the precision of the
ATT-estimates improved.
24As an additional robustness check, we employed a mixed method that combines PSM and a linear conditional
DID estimator. As explained above, this last empirical method is a weighted regressions (with the NN-matching
weights) of the di⁄erence in outcomes on the treatment status and other controls. Results are available upon request.
235).25 As expected and consistent with the existing literature, the estimates in Table 3 show that
displaced workers experienced signi￿cant earnings loss during the year of displacement. This loss is
evident when looking both at the unadjusted mean comparison which considers the entire sample,
and at the estimation results of propensity score matching. The latter method suggests that the
earnings loss equals 12 percent in the year of displacement and 5 percent during the ￿ve years after
displacement (years 1,2,3,4,5). During the ￿rst three years after displacement, displaced workers
experienced an earnings loss of 7 percent. This negative e⁄ect faded away thereafter. Estimates
from the propensity score matching di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence model shown in table 4 display signi￿cant
earnings losses in the year of displacement. Estimated coe¢ cients are negative but not signi￿cant
in the ￿rst three years after displacement and also in the fourth and ￿fth years. As can be seen
from tables 3 and 4, unsurprisingly, there is a signi￿cant reduction in the number of weeks worked
for the displaced workers in the three years after displacement, which becomes less relevant in the
subsequent years. The small magnitude of earnings losses is probably due in part to the fact that
we have selected individuals with at least three years of tenure, while other studies focus on more
experienced workers. Moreover, previous studies (e.g., Eliason and Storrie, 2006 who use a PSM
estimator and Jacobson et al. (1993)) have shown that earnings losses are sensitive to the business
cycle, even in the long run. Eliason and Storrie (2006) associated this sensitivity to business cycle to
the fact that displaced workers, holding relatively short-tenured jobs and therefore a relatively low
level of human capital, are more likely to experience additional episodes of displacement because
their skills are less valuable to the employer. This explanation, in turn, is based on the contribution
by Stevens (1997), who found that displaced workers who incur additional job separations have
substantially greater earnings losses. An alternative interpretation of this phenomenon relates the
25Coe¢ cients estimated on a yearly basis are available upon request.
24higher propensity of displaced workers to hold several short-lived jobs to the fact that transitions
from job to job tend to be relatively longer during periods of recession (Hall, 1995). Holmlund
and Storrie (2002) found that transitions from temporary jobs increased rapidly at the beginning
of a recession. In fact, during the period under analysis the performance of the Italian labour
market was improving.26 The unemployment rate remained practically stable at around 11.3 %
in the period of 1994-1998 and then declined monotonically to 8.7 percent in 2002.27 Overall, the
evidence from this study seems to be consistent with these conjectures.28
The novel and most interesting contributions of this paper are, however, the results for job safety.
We have at our disposal three proxies for risk that the two groups of workers face at their workplaces:
the probability of being injured, the number of injuries reported and the number of out-of-work days
because of injuries. Injuries at the workplace are rare events; therefore, to smooth these outcomes,
we consider three time windows: the entire post-displacement period (years 0,1,2,3,4,5), the ￿rst
four years after displacement (years 0,1,2,3; the "short run") and the subsequent two years (4,5;
the "longer run"). However, these measures of job risk are limited dependent variables and count
variables, whose analysis is meaningful only if the control and treated groups have the same lengths
of exposure to risk. Moreover, as we have just observed, the displaced workers tend to work fewer
weeks than the control group. Therefore, all of the-above mentioned injury measures are normalized
by the total number of weeks worked in the respective reference periods to account for the di⁄erent
lengths of exposure to risk. In short, the logic behind these measures of job-safety is as follows.
An injury is a rare event and increasing the size of the window of observation increases the quality
26In 1997, the reform of the Italian labor market introduced ￿exibility at the margin.
27The employment to population ratio and the labor force participation rate had symmetrically opposite temporal
patterns. They were relatively stable in the period of 1994-1998, at 42.2% and 47.5%, respectively, and then
increased monotonically to 44.3% and 48.5% in 2002.
28Serti (2008) estimates positive and signi￿cant earning losses for Italian workers which were displaced in a period
of recession. He employs the standard Jacobson et al. (1993) econometric model.
25of the proxy. Then, a normalized variable is needed, as in the post-displacement period displaced
individuals work less than non-displaced individuals.
Table 5 presents the results for the probability of being injured and the number of injuries in the
post-displacement period, estimated by a linear regression and the nearest neighbour propensity
score matching. The di⁄erence in the probability of being injured between the displaced and non-
displaced workers is positive and highly signi￿cant in all years after displacement (year 0 included).
The PSM estimated e⁄ect is equal to 0.087, implying a 72 percent increase in the workplace risk
after displacement. The results for the normalized measure are qualitatively identical, and the
estimated e⁄ect is equal to 0.0004, implying a 100 percent greater probability of being injured during
subsequent employment relative to the control group. These positive and signi￿cant e⁄ects are also
present in the fourth and ￿fth years after displacement for the non-normalized and normalized
measures and are equal to 0.052 and 0.0006, respectively, suggesting that the e⁄ect of displacement
on job-safety is relatively long-lasting. The results from the simple linear regression are very similar,
although the losses are somewhat smaller. These ￿ndings are con￿rmed by the estimates obtained
from the PSM-DID procedure (see Table 6). In this procedure, we implement PSM-DID only for
the normalized variables for the following reasons. Because the outcomes of interest are computed
over periods of di⁄erent lengths before and after displacement, and because exposure to risk varies
considerably with the number of weeks worked, we divide our dependent variables by the number of
weeks worked. The pre-displacement normalized variables are computed over the three years before
displacement. Once again, the results of the linear unconditional DID are very similar, although
the intensity of the displacement e⁄ect is in some cases slightly lower.
The strong positive e⁄ect for the entire post-displacement period is also found for the total
number of injuries after displacement and for the total number of days lost due to injuries, both
26non-normalized and normalized (Table 5 and Table 7, respectively). The estimated e⁄ect for the
former non-normalized outcome is equal to 0.106, implying a 69 percent di⁄erential in the number
of injuries, while the e⁄ect for the non-normalized days lost is equal to 2.86 and suggests a 89
percent increase in the number of days lost due to injuries. These ￿ndings are also con￿rmed by the
estimates of the normalized variables which suggest a 100% increase in the number of injuries per
week and a 116% increase in the number of days on injury leave per working week. Moreover, we
again check the robustness of these results by employing a propensity score matching-di⁄erence-in-
di⁄erence procedure. As can be seen from Tables 6 and 8, also in this case the displaced workers in
the post-displacement period (years 0,1,2,3,4,5) face a signi￿cant increase in the number of injuries
per week and out-of-work days per week after displacement, relative to the non-displaced workers
(the estimated coe¢ cients are equal to 0.0005 and 0.015 , respectively). In addition, the estimated
coe¢ cients on the fourth and ￿fth years show a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect of displacement on the
number of injuries and on the days lost because of injury, suggesting that the e⁄ect of displacement
on job safety is relatively constant over time. Finally, it is interesting to note that a signi￿cant
e⁄ect in terms of sickness absences emerges only during the ￿rst three years after displacement (see
Table 9 and 10).
Overall, we found strong evidence of negative non-pecuniary e⁄ects of job displacement for the
displaced workers. In particular, we have documented that the negative e⁄ect of displacement on job
safety is robust to di⁄erent outcome measures (and estimation techniques) and is not diminishing
over time. These results, together with the modest losses in terms of earnings and weeks worked and
the positive aggregate labor market trends, seem to suggest that re-employed displaced workers,
to avoid unemployment or earnings losses, trade away pecuniary job attributes for non-pecuniary
ones even during a period of positive labour market performance..
27Workers can give up job safety by working at more hazardous jobs and/or by accepting job-
instability, that is, several temporary and short-lived jobs that may be available in a period of
economic expansion.29 Indeed, as ￿gure 3 shows, the monthly injury hazard rate30 initially increases
and reaches its peak three months after the beginning of a new job, and decreases thereafter and
becomes relatively ￿ at after the 20th month. In an additional exercise (see table 11), we also ￿nd
evidence that the e⁄ect of job displacement on the number of new jobs begun by a worker (a proxy
for job instability) is notably high during the short run (0,1,2,3), but this e⁄ect drammatically
decreases during the last post-displacement years . We interpret these results as indicative of the
relationship between more risky jobs and reductions in job safety.
6 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed an important dimension of the costs of job loss that has not yet received
much attention in the literature, namely its e⁄ect on job-related injuries. It complements previous
studies that have investigated the e⁄ects of job displacement in terms of standard labour market
outcomes. We argue that, to provide a comprehensive picture of the e⁄ects of job displacement and
to conduct a complete welfare analysis, it is crucial to also incorporate the non-pecuniary aspects
of working conditions into the study.
We ￿nd that, in a period with a tight labor market, re-employed displaced workers in Italy
experience only moderate and short-lived earnings losses, but, as a consequence of displacement,
they are also about 70 percent more likely to be injured while working at subsequent jobs compared
to the control group of non-displaced workers. In addition, this e⁄ect on job safety is not transitory
29All displaced workers who we consider in the analysis are eligible recipients of unemployment insurance.
30Monthly hazard rates for all observed job-relationships.
28and does not simply depend on the fact that displaced workers pass through many temporary jobs
and experience high injury hazard rates at the beginning of every new job. Considering that the
e⁄ect of displacement on job instability is decreasing in time and that the e⁄ect on injuries is
persistent over time, we argue that the e⁄ect of displacement on workplace injuries must be mainly
ascribed to transitions to more hazardous jobs rather than to a mere duration e⁄ect. These results
suggest that re-employed displaced workers may trade away pecuniary losses for non-pecuniary
ones to reduce unemployment spells or avoid larger earnings losses, even during a period of positive
labour market performance.
Our work is in line with and complements previous studies that have documented higher long-
run mortality rates among displaced workers (Elliason and Storrie, 2009, Moser et al., 1987. Morris
et al. 1994, Sullivan and Von Wachter, 2009) and those who claim to have observed a business-cycle
sensitivity of earning losses (Eliason and Storrie, 2006, Jacobson et al., 1993).
Our results call for more attention to be devoted to policies designed to re-integrate displaced
workers into the labor market. In particular, our results imply that labor market policies should
also be concerned with job quality, particularly with job safety. On one hand, ￿nding a new job
could rapidly minimize losses in terms of human capital depreciation for the displaced workers and
could reduce the use of unemployment bene￿ts. On the other hand, a lower job safety level may
imply other individual and social costs. The short-run and long-run costs of re-employment at a
more hazardous job might outweigh the savings in terms of unemployment bene￿ts and human
capital depreciation. Therefore the reemployment of displaced individuals could be accompanied
by training programs such as on-the job training that are aimed at reducing the risk of injuries
through the development of speci￿c safety-training methods.
29Appendix
Table 1: Composition of the sample by industry
Industries N. of obs. % ratio of % of Av. weight
before treat/contr. matched of matched
matching before matching treated controls
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 1188 0.8 100.0 1.1
Textile, Apparel and Leather 2690 3.6 100.0 1.1
Wood, Paper, Printing and Publishing 1493 1.3 100.0 1.0
Cook, Chemical, Rubber and Plastic 2045 0.6 100.0 1.0
Non-metallic minerals, Metal and metallic products 4350 1.4 98.4 1.0
Machines manufacturing (including vehicles) 5475 0.8 100.0 1.0
Other manufacturing industries 784 1.7 100.0 1.1
Commerce, Hotels and Restaurants 5085 2.4 92.6 1.0
Transport and communications 2064 0.6 86.6 1.0
Financial intermediation and Business services 5088 0.9 100.0 1.1
Other community, social and personal service act. 428 1.9 100.0 1.0
All industries 31212 1.4 96.0 1.1
30Table 2a: Quality of Matching
Variables Sample 1) Mean 2) Mean 3) Stand. 4) p>jtj
Treated Controls Bias
Sex U .553 .713 -33.5 .000
M .568 .541 3.5 .630
Age U 35.111 37.653 -29.3 .000
M 34.899 36.200 -15.0 .029
Tenure U 7.939 9.105 -47.0 .000
M 7.991 8.146 -6.3 .382
ln(aggregate earnings)1994 U 4.853 5.120 -48.1 .000
M 4.850 4.869 -3.2 .627
Worked weeks1994 U 48.027 49.725 -17.5 .000
M 48.442 48.264 1.8 .799
Dummy Prod. Worker U .659 .535 25.4 .000
M .656 .645 2.4 .719
Dummy Basic Non Prod. W. U .305 .402 -20.5 .000
M .306 .317 -2.5 .712
Dummy Adv. Non Prod. W. U .009 .038 -19.1 .002
M .009 .009 0.0 1.000
Dummy Manager U .002 .014 -13.4 .032
M .002 .004 -2.6 .564
Number of jobs1994 U 1.036 1.023 6.9 .108
M 1.035 1.035 0.0 1.000
U=unmatched samples; M=matched samples
31Table 2b: Quality of Matching
Variables Sample 1) Mean Treated 2) Mean Controls 3) Stand. Bias 4) p>jtj
Dummy working in North U .587 .545 8.4 .080
M .586 .564 4.3 .533
Dummy working in Center U .316 .289 5.8 .219
M .320 .296 5.1 .458
Dummy working in South U .097 .165 -20.3 .000
M .094 .139 -13.3 .042
Dummy born in North U .506 .458 9.5 .047
M .508 .489 3.8 .584
Dummy born in Center U .275 .257 4.1 .391
M .283 .271 2.7 .702
Dummy born in South U .169 .253 -20.6 .000
M .165 .219 -13.3 .045
Dummy born in OECD U .009 .009 -.3 .948
M .009 .005 4.9 .413
Dummy born in non-OECD U .038 .021 10.3 .011
M .035 .016 11.1 .084
Firm Employees1994 U 147.68 4444.80 -39.4 .000
M 153.5 308.46 -1.4 .438
Number of Injuries1994￿96 U .113 .117 3.4 .473
M .136 .125 3.0 .688
N. of episodes of sickness leave1994￿96 U .483 .457 3.3 .496
M .489 .475 1.8 .789
N. of days of injury leave1994￿96 U 1.589 2.220 -5.9 .332
M 1.656 1.633 0.2 .961
N. of episodes of U .113 .120 -1.8 .710
"Cassa integrazione"1994￿96 M .118 .082 7.7 .222
U=unmatched samples; M=matched samples
32TABLE 3: The e⁄ect of displacement on the number of worked weeks and earnings for the initial sample
and the matched sample.
LEVELS All Sample Matched Sample
Variables Mean Mean OLS Mean Mean PSM
Treated Controls Treated Controls
N. of Worked Weeks 23.46 49.95 -26.49*** 23.71 48.20 -24.49***
0 (14.21) (7.51) [.37] (14.25) (10.04) [.86]
N. of Worked Weeks 230.89 246.37 -15.48*** 231.91 238.89 -6.98***
1,2,3,4,5 (37.00) (28.12) [.135] (36.32) (34.94) [2.47]
N. of Worked Weeks 139.19 149.03 -9.84*** 139.53 144.58 -5.05***
1,2,3 (25.48) (17.94) [.87] (25.07) (22.93) [1.68]
N. of Worked Weeks 91.71 97.34 -5.64*** 92.38 94.31 -1.93
4 and 5 (18.53) (15.36) [.74] (17.97) (17.99) [1.26]
ln(Earnings) 4.83 5.23 -.40*** 4.83 4.96 -.12***
0 (.64) (.50) [.02] (.63) (.52) [.04]
ln(Earnings) 6.58 6.89 -.31*** 6.59 6.64 -.05*
1,2,3,4,5 (.44) (.48) [.02] (.44) (.44) [.03]
ln(Earnings) 6.05 6.37 -.32*** 6.06 6.12 -.07**
1,2,3 (.46) (.48) [.02] (.45) (.45) [.03]
ln(Earnings) 5.67 5.96 -.30*** 5.67 5.71 -.04
4 and 5 (.52) (.54) [.03] (.52) (.51) [.04]
Note: * p-value <0.1, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01.
Std err. and std. dev. in brackets. Standard errors from Nearest
Neighbour Matching are computed analytically as in Lechner (2001).
33TABLE 4: The e⁄ect of displacement on the number of worked weeks and earnings for the initial sample
and the matched sample.
DID All Sample Matched Sample
Variables OLS PSM
N. of Worked Weeks -24.79*** -24.67***
0 [.49] [1.08]
N. of Worked Weeks -13.78*** -7.16***
1,2,3,4,5 [1.33] [2.47]
N. of Worked Weeks -8.15*** -5.23***
1,2,3 [.88] [1.70]
N. of Worked Weeks -3.94*** -2.11








4 and 5 [.02] [.04]
Note: * p-value <0.1, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01. Estimates from
Di⁄erences-in-Di⁄erences and Propensity Score Matching Di⁄-in-Di⁄
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors from Nearest
Neighbour Matching are computed analytically as in Lechner (2001).
34TABLE 5: The e⁄ect of displacement on the probability of injury and number of injuries for the initial
sample and the matched sample.
LEVELS All Sample Matched Sample
Variables Mean Mean OLS Mean Mean PSM
Treated Controls Treated Controls
Probability of Injury .205 .145 .061*** .207 .120 .087***
0,1,2,3,4,5 (.404) (.352) [.017] (.406) (.325) [.026]
Probability of Injury .151 .109 .042*** .151 .101 .049**
0,1,2,3 (.359) (.313) [.015] (.358) (.302) [.023]
Probability of Injuries .081 .052 .030*** .085 .033 .052***
4 and 5 (.274) (.221) [.011] (.279) (.179) [.016]
Prob.Inj. per worked week .0008 .0005 .0003*** .0008 .0004 .0004***
0,1,2,3,4,5 (.0017) (.0012) [.0000] (.0017) (.0011) [.0001]
Prob.Inj. per worked week .0010 .0006 .0004*** .0010 .0005 .0005***
0,1,2,3 (.0025) (.0016) [.0000] (.0025) (.0016) [.0001]
Prob.Inj. per worked week .0009 .0006 .0003*** .0009 .0003 .0006***
4 and 5 (.0029) (.0024) [.0001] (.0030) (.0018) [.0002]
N. of Injuries .260 .195 .065** .259 .153 .106***
0,1,2,3,4,5 (.561) (.557) [.027] (.557) (.473) [.036]
N. of Injuries .176 .137 .039* .172 .113 .059**
0,1,2,3 (.442) (.443) [.021] (.430) (.359) [.028]
N. of Injuries .084 .058 .026** .087 .040 .047***
4 and 5 (.285) (.260) [.012] (.290) (.229) [.018]
N. of Injuries per w.w. .0010 .0007 .0004*** .0010 .0005 .0005***
0,1,2,3,4,5 (.0022) (.0019) [.0000] (.0022) (.0016) [.0001]
N. of Injuries per w.w. .0011 .0007 .0004*** .0011 .0006 .0005***
0,1,2,3 (.0029) (.0022) [.0001] (.0029) (.0019) [.0002]
N. of Injuries per w.w. .0009 .0006 .0003*** .0009 .0004 .0005***
4 and 5 (.0030) (.0028) [.0001] (.0031) (.0023) [.0002]
Note: * p-value <0.1, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01.
Std err. and std. dev. in brackets. Standard errors from Nearest Neighbour Matching are
computed analytically as in Lechner (2001).
35TABLE 6: The e⁄ect of displacement on the probability of injury and the number of injuries for the
initial sample and the matched sample.
DID All Sample Matched Sample
Variables OLS PSM
Prob.Inj. per worked week .0002** .0004**
0,1,2,3,4,5 [.0001] [.0002]
Prob.Inj. per worked week .0003*** .0004**
0,1,2,3 [.0001] [.0002]
Prob.Inj. per worked week .0002 .0005**
4 and 5 [.0001] [.0002]
N. of Injuries per w.w. .0003** .0005**
0,1,2,3,4,5 [.0001] [.0002]
N. of Injuries per w.w. .0004** .0005**
0,1,2,3 [.0001] [.0002]
N. of Injuries per w.w. .0002 .0005*
4 and 5 [.0002] [.0003]
Note: * p-value <0.1, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01. Estimates from Di⁄erences-
in-Di⁄erences and Propensity Score Matching Di⁄erences-in-Di⁄erences. Standard errors
in brackets. Standard errors from Nearest Neighbour Matching are computed
analytically as in Lechner (2001).
TABLE 7: The e⁄ect of displacement on the days on injury leave for the initial sample and the matched
sample
LEVELS All Sample Matched Sample
Variables Mean Mean OLS Mean Mean PSM
Treated Controls Treated Controls
Days on Inj. leave 5.94 5.13 .81 6.07 3.21 2.86**
0,1,2,3,4,5 (18.79) (24.41) [1.16] (19.11) (13.62) [1.15]
Days on Inj. leave 3.84 3.40 .45 3.88 2.25 1.63**
0,1,2,3 (14.33) (17.62) [.84] (14.55) (10.64) [.88]
Days on Inj. leave 2.10 1.73 .37 2.19 .96 1.23*
4 and 5 (10.99) (15.83) [.75] (11.21) (7.34) [.66]
Days on Inj. leave per w.w. .0232 .0177 .0055 .0236 .0109 .0127***
0,1,2,3,4,5 (.0733) (.0849) [.0041] (.0745) (.0467) [.0043]
Days on Inj. leave per w.w. .0243 .0175 .0068 .0245 .0113 .0132**
0,1,2,3 (.0944) (.0932) [.0045] (.0959) (.0526) [.0053]
Days on Inj. leave per w.w. .0240 .0188 .0052 .0250 .0096 .0153**
4 and 5 (.1383) (.1802) [.0086] (.1412) (.0728) [.0073]
Note: * p-value <0.1, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01.
Std err. and std. dev. in brackets. Standard errors from Nearest Neighbour
Matching are computed analytically as in Lechner (2001).
36TABLE 8: The e⁄ect of displacement on days on injury leave for the initial sample and the matched
sample.
DID All Sample Matched Sample
Variables OLS PSM
Days on Inj. leave per w.w. .010* .015**
0,1,2,3,4,5 [.006] [.006]
Days on Inj. leave per w.w. .011* .016**
0,1,2,3 [.006] [.007]
Days on Inj. leave per w.w. .010 .018**
4 and 5 [.010] [.009]
Note: * p-value <0.1, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01. Estimates from
Di⁄erences-in-Di⁄erences and Propensity Score Matching Di⁄erences-in-
Di⁄erences. Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors from Nearest
Neighbour Matching are computed analytically as in Lechner (2001).
TABLE 9: The e⁄ect of displacement on the probability of sickness absence for the initial sample and the
matched sample
LEVELS All Sample Matched Sample
Variables Mean Mean OLS Mean Mean PSM
Treated Controls Treated Controls
Prob. of sickness absences .519 .439 .080*** .518 .489 .028
0,1,2,3,4,5 (.500) (.496) [.024] (.500) (.500) [.035]
Prob. of sickness absences .431 .368 .063*** .431 .395 .035
0,1,2,3 (.496) (.482) [.023] (.496) (.489) [.034]
Prob. of sickness absences .262 .249 .013 .259 .252 .007
4 and 5 (.440) (.432) [.021] (.439) (.435) [.030]
Prob. of sickness abs. per w.w. .0021 .0015 .0005*** .0020 .0018 .0002**
0,1,2,3,4,5 (.0020) (.0018) [.0000] (.0020) (.0018) [.0001]
Prob. of sickness abs. per w.w. .0028 .0019 .0009*** .0027 .0021 .0006***
0,1,2,3 (.0034) (.0026) [.0001] (.0033) (.0028) [.0002]
Prob. of sickness abs. per w.w. .0029 .0027 .0002 .0029 .0029 .0000
4 and 5 (.0052) (.0052) [.0002] (.0051) (.0056) [.0004]
Note: * p-value <0.1, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01.
Std err. and std. dev. in brackets. Standard errors from Nearest Neighbour Matching are
computed analytically as in Lechner (2001).
37TABLE 10: The e⁄ect of displacement on the probability of sickness absence for the initial sample and
the matched sample.
.
DID All Sample Matched Sample
Variables OLS PSM
Probability of sickness abs. per w.w. .0003** .0003
0,1,2,3,4,5 [.0001] [.0002]
Probability of sickness abs. per w.w. .0006*** .0006**
0,1,2,3 [.0001] [.0003]
Probability of sickness abs. per w.w. -.0000 -.0000
4 and 5 [.0002] [.0004]
Note: * p-value <0.1, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01. Estimates from Di⁄erences-
in-Di⁄erences and Propensity Score Matching Di⁄erences-in-Di⁄erences. Standard errors
in brackets. Standard errors from Nearest Neighbour Matching are computed
analytically as in Lechner (2001).
TABLE 11: The e⁄ect of displacement on the number of new jobs
LEVELS All Sample Matched Sample
Variables Mean Mean OLS Mean Mean PSM
Treated Controls Treated Controls
Number of new jobs 1.38 .25 1.13*** 1.96 .52 1.44***
0,1,2,3,4,5 (.66) (.55) [.02] (1.24) (.95) [.075]
Number of new jobs 1.21 .18 1.06*** 1.60 .31 1.28***
0,1,2,3 (.44) (.40) [.02] (.91) (.69) [.06]
Number of new jobs .18 .11 .07*** .36 .21 .15***
4 and 5 (.41) (.33) [.01] (.75) (.54) [.05]
Note: * p-value <0.1, ** p-value<0.05, *** p-value<0.01.
Std err. and std. dev. in brackets. Standard errors from Nearest Neighbour
Matching are computed analytically as in Lechner (2001).
38Figure 1: Multidimensionality in job characteristics.
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